Foreign Capital Flows, Real Exchange and Interest Rates: An Analytical Framework by Goyal, Ashima
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Foreign Capital Flows, Real Exchange
and Interest Rates: An Analytical
Framework
Ashima Goyal
1997
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/73537/
MPRA Paper No. 73537, posted 7 September 2016 08:25 UTC
1 
 
Preprint from Journal of Foreign Exchange and International Finance, Vol. 9(3), pp. 215-232. Oct.-Dec. 1997 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Capital Flows, Real Exchange and Interest Rates: An Analytical Framework  
 
Ashima Goyal

 
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research 
Gen. Vaidya Marg, Santosh Nagar, 
Goregaon (E), Mumbai-400 065 
ashima @ igidr.ac.in 
Tel.: +91-22-28416512 Fax: +91-22-28402752  
http://www.igidr.ac.in/~ashima 
 
Abstract  
We build a framework to explain surges in capital flows, volatility in real exchange and 
interest rates and derive implications for policy. Our framework is adapted to the features of a 
labour surplus developing country with a large share of non-traded goods, and focuses on the 
medium-run. Classes of high and low growth equilibria are shown to occur. Movements in 
expected and actual real exchange rates, reinforce those in normalized output and inflation. In 
such circumstances, a traditional monetary stabilization, following on a supply shock or surge 
in foreign inflows, can lead to an overshooting of the real rate of interest or the exchange rate 
and raise inflation from the supply side. Careful coordination of monetary and fiscal policies 
can, however, shift the economy to the high growth path and minimize fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction 
As both the volume of international capital flows and the share going to developing countries 
(DCs) rise, important questions of short-term management and optimal long-term use arise. 
Countries in South-East Asia have managed better than those in Latin America; they have 
turned these inflows into an opportunity. When reform is accompanied by an inflow of 
foreign capital, market forces can appreciate nominal exchange rate. But this is incompatible 
with the goal of stimulating exports and keeping foreign liabilities at sustainable levels. If 
authorities adopt a managed float, money supply can over expand as foreign exchange 
reserves accumulate. If reserves are sterilized pressure is felt on interest rates as money 
supply contracts.  
 
To be helpful analysis must be conducted in models that reflect the institutional structure of 
the economy concerned. We adapt the Mundell-Fleming (M-F) model of the open economy 
to target a medium run for a small open but large domestic economy such as India, and to 
give priority to growth. It is then used to understand the surges in foreign capital, the 
fluctuations in interest, exchange rates and activity they give rise to, and the policies required 
to harness them in the interests of development. These are vital issues facing reformers today.  
 
The literature on exchange rate movements is concerned either with the very short-run 
activities of speculators, or very long-run monetary stock adjustment processes. Kenen 
(1985) has argued that we need to find ways of analyzing the medium-run. This is 
particularly urgent in a DC, where the key concern is to find policies that trigger growth. 
Transition to a steady state with full utilization of resources, naturally has a medium-run 
dimension. Excess volatility in a DC is caused not so much by short-run speculative 
movements as by expectations about medium-run growth prospects. Extensive empirical tests 
have not found support for either the simple speculative efficiency hypothesis or for 
monetary models of exchange rate determination (Taylor, 1995). The time is ripe to explore 
alternatives.  
 
A constant real exchange rate is desirable, after a devaluation, to maintain export 
competitiveness. A fixed exchange rate will implement the targeted real exchange rate only 
under certain conditions including equality of domestic and world rate of inflation. Free 
floating leads to undesirable fluctuations in exchange rates. The current account is forced to 
adjust to possibly transient changes in the capital account.  
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In Dornbusch's 1976 model, the exchange rate appreciates over its fundamental value because 
asset prices move faster than goods prices or output, and therefore tend to move too much to 
compensate for a sluggish goods price response. Instead of prices falling, when money supply 
contracts, interest rates rise, capital flows in, the exchange rate overshoots until expected 
future depreciation compensates for the high interest rates.  
 
We show that, because of this speed of movement in asset prices and quantities, monetary 
tightness can lead to a sharp rise in real interest rates matched by an expected devaluation, in 
a managed float. But instead of prices eventually falling, fundamentals worsen, and the rate 
of inflation can actually rise. The stage is set for a panic flight of capital. Adverse shocks, if 
treated with traditional macro stabilization policies, can lead to sharp movements in interest 
rates, that precipitate the crisis they are designed to avoid. Stabilization includes monetary 
tightening in order to control inflation. But it can raise the real rate of interest and cause 
inflation from the supply side. The monetary theory of the nominal exchange rate regards it 
as the relative price of domestic and foreign money, if domestic money stock falls, the 
equilibrium rate should appreciate; we show that if real factors determining the real exchange 
rate are allowed for the opposite result holds. In a world of high capital mobility, the 
monetary theory is suspect.  
 
Equilibrium real exchange rates depreciate in the case of low growth. The equilibrium real 
exchange rate is ultimately determined by real factors, such as productivity. We show that if 
investment rises, rising net imports and inflows can be sustained at a constant real exchange 
rate. A shock to the real interest rate, by lowering the present value of future discounted 
output, will lower investment, inflows, and require a depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Even so, it is possible to coordinate macro policies to enhance development. Movements in 
expected and actual real exchange rates, reinforce those in normalized output and inflation, so 
that classes of high and low growth multiple equilibria can occur. Policies must be carefully 
chosen to shift the economy to the set of "good" equilibria. Then fluctuations in exchange or 
real interest rates, and abrupt movements in foreign capital may be avoided. These are very 
relevant issues. In India both in 1995 and 1997 high real interest rates were correlated with a 
sudden depreciation of the real exchange rate. In Malaysia the policy was to depreciate the 
real exchange rate in line with the excess of domestic over international inflation, but 
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domestic interest rates were allowed to exceed international. Crises struck in 1997 with a 
forced depreciation exceeding 30 per cent.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: First we compare institutions and events across 
countries to decide the most relevant model for our purpose. Section 3 adapts aggregate 
demand-supply and M-F models to the medium run. Section 4 checks that this is consistent 
with intertemporal optimization and derives the equilibrium real exchange rate. Next we 
discuss co-movements in key variables in the multiple equilibria and offer suggestions for 
policy. The final section contains a brief summary. 
 
2. Institutional Features and Modeling Strategies 
Bruno and Sachs (1985) argue that it is incorrect to apply a generic macro model to all 
countries, and it is especially necessary to distinguish between developed and DCs. We want 
to extend the argument to allow for institutional variations among DCs themselves. A model 
that incorporates institutional features will give more reliable answers. This section attempts 
to develop an understanding of relevant institutional structure in India and use it in designing 
our model.  
 
The Foreign Exchange and Asset Markets  
As capital transactions of most DCs are a small percentage of world totals, they cannot affect 
world interest rates. But can the latter influence domestic rates? If there is no full 
convertibility on the capital account, domestic and foreign assets cannot be close substitutes 
and domestic interest rates have a measure of autonomy. Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and 
Foreign Portfolio Investors can freely bring in and take out capital but domestic residents 
cannot. But, since the mid-seventies, those who have legal or illegal full capital account 
convertibility have become large marginal players in the domestic economy. It is still feasible 
to pay internal savings less than the world interest rate, but foreign savings must be paid a 
competitive rate, taking account of country risk and expected changes in the exchange rate. 
Therefore the assumption of perfect international arbitrage is a reasonable working 
hypothesis to make.  
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Many asset markets are thin or non-existent. The foreign exchange market is dominated by a 
few large public institutions. Therefore the academic literature
1
 on speculation and the 
exchange rates is somewhat irrelevant. Speculation is more a function of the entry and exit 
decision of foreign portfolio companies and NRIs, and the more easily orchestrated response 
of the public institutions. Capital inflows are the result of the decisions of institutions and 
foreign residents rather than portfolio diversification decisions of domestic individuals.  
 
Instead of being determined by the expectations of millions of individual traders about the 
sustainability of the level of the exchange rate, speculation is determined much more by 
uncertainty relating to the fundamentals. Especially in a period of structural change, there is 
always uncertainty about the future rate of growth. Variables such as investment, inflation 
and exports help form these expectations. Unfortunately, the adjustments in these variables 
can themselves be deviation amplifying and feed into self-fulfilling prophecies. The presence 
of multiple equilibria helps make speculation destabilizing.  
 
The Goods Market  
Purchasing power parity or PPP states that arbitrage in commodities is perfect enough to keep 
the real exchange rate at a constant equilibrium value. But DCs are small in world commodity 
markets, border prices are exogenous for them. So that if PPP holds in the one good M-F 
model, the real exchange rate cannot vary. Disaggregation is therefore essential for realism. 
DCs typically have a large non-traded (NT) goods sector. A depreciation would lead to a shift 
of resources to the traded (T) goods sector. In the dependent economy model the Dutch 
Disease can occur when exports rise. The prices of non-traded goods rise and welfare falls. In 
addition, if a distinction is made between exportables and importables, changes in the terms 
of trade affect income and demand. For a primary goods exporter, these latter effects can be 
large, particularly with a secular worsening of the terms of trade.  
 
In India, the import of consumer goods is still banned and the assumption of surplus labour is 
a useful first approximation. Therefore the demand and labour supply effects of terms of 
trade shocks are not dominant. There is a distinct possibility of expanding the exports of 
                                                          
1
 Empirical studies of developed economies are reporting that short term exchange rate movements are often 
due, not to fundamentals, but to ‘chartists’ (traders who base their strategy on past price movements and have a 
short horizon) and ‘stop-loss’ traders. The latter sell a currency whose price falls below some critical threshold 
(Williamson 1993). Krugman (1991) argued that a credible moving band for the exchange rate will lead to 
speculation that is stabilizing. Near the bottom of the band the speculator’s expectation of appreciation will 
cause her to purchase the domestic currency and thus lead to appreciation. 
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skilled and unskilled labour intensive commodities. Labour is severely underutilized. 
Therefore we assume the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. A rise in the real exchange rate 
both draws resources to the export sector and raises export demand. The absorption of more 
labour in higher productivity activities as exports expand can raise incomes and demand, as 
in South-East Asia, without immediately raising the prices of NT goods.  
 
The share of NT goods was forty per cent of Indian output in the eighties—the share of the 
domestic economy is large. A combination of a large domestic and small open economy has 
to be modelled. World prices are exogenous but a devaluation can lead to a rise in the real 
exchange rate if the rise in prices of NT goods is lower than that of T goods. Therefore it is 
the impact of devaluation on domestic inflation that will ultimately decide if the depreciation 
of the real exchange rate can be sustained.  
 
A devaluation raises the burden of both intermediate imports (largely oil) and repayment of 
external debt. But their impact is first on the Government budget. It is a policy decision 
whether to allow devaluation to reflect on domestic oil prices. In addition, insofar as 
devaluation is accompanied by a reduction in very high rates of duties on intermediates, its 
inflationary impact is muted. As reforms seek to open out more of what was a closed 
economy, the key factor to analyze in transition, is the shrinking of the NT sector, or the 
rising weight of the T sector (exportables) in the consumption basket, and its impact on 
wages and inflation.  
 
The Labour Market  
Institutional features can influence the design of macro policies. It is argued that in Germany, 
for example, real wages are rigid since the average contract length is only one year. 
Therefore, in the face of an adverse supply shock a tight monetary policy is necessary to 
prevent inflation. In the US the average nominal wage contract is for 3 years. 
 
Stimulatory monetary policy by raising prices can lower real wages and maintain 
employment. In a DC with vast reserves of human resources, utilized at below the production 
frontier, real wages are low and a further fall cannot be the major mode of adjustment
2
. In 
                                                          
2
 In 1996, a migrant muslim worker in Bhiwandi's thriving informal power-loom sector earned Rs. 1,500. He 
would eat (thick flour rotis dipped in a common broth) in a communal kitchen called a bissi. The cost, Rs. 500 a 
month. The rest would be remitted to support his family in his village. 
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such countries stimulatory macro policies can actually lower the rate of inflation, and raise 
real wages, even in the face of a supply shock. The reason is that productivity rises as labour 
is reallocated to more productive industries, and mark-ups fall as overheads are spread. It is 
not essential for some industries to shrink for others to expand.  
After the oil shock, middle income countries sustained such policies by foreign borrowing 
and did much better than the West (Bruno and Sachs, 1985).  
 
In a poor and populous DC, the more realistic assumption to make is that the firm is on its 
supply curve of labour. Although the labour market is a buyer's market, real wages are rigid 
in terms of food, because poor nutrition leads to a drop in worker efficiency in the informal 
and agricultural sectors. The optimizing employer would therefore want to keep real 
consumption wages constant.  
 
Nominal wages, in the NT goods sector, are closely linked to the price of food. A supply 
shock that impinges on the latter can set off a wage price spiral. It would be moderated, 
however, if growth remained high and output and productivity rose with reallocation of 
labour. If growth slowed, and the supply shock built into an expected rise in nominal wages, 
a higher rate of inflation would result.  
 
Devaluation directly causes inflation in Latin American countries, as strong income conflict 
works as a propagation mechanism, converting a supply shock into an accelerating inflation. 
No group is willing to take a fall in its income share in response to terms of a trade shock. 
But in India the average per capita income level is about one fourth that in Latin America, 
and this affects the range of feasible choices. One implication is the absence of sharp income 
conflict. The trade share is low and food comprises a major part of NT goods. Where almost 
two-thirds of the average budget is spent on food, the price of the latter is a major 
determinant of inflation. A large drop in real wages is not feasible.  
 
A policy decision was made, coinciding with the devaluation, to raise food procurement 
prices, as a precursor of agricultural trade liberalization. It was this attempt to reduce the gap 
between domestic food prices and their border prices, rather than the devaluation itself, that 
lead to inflation and the accumulation of huge domestic food grain stocks soon after the 
reform (Goyal 1995a). The transition dynamics to a more open regime needs to be carefully 
sequenced. Imports may not be a solution, in transition, as at low average wage levels, 
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international prices are often not affordable. Food habits take time to alter, and in the 
medium-run substitutability at the new international margin of adjustment is low.  
 
In the formal sector, real wages can respond flexibly to macroeconomic shocks. The average 
wage contract is negotiated after three years. Only four per cent of the labour force is 
unionized and minimum wage laws are not strictly enforced. COLA or automatic cost of 
living adjustments, widespread in Latin America, are rare. Inspite of trade unions and 
restrictions on exit, real wages adjust through changes in composition. For example, by 
increasing the tasks contracted out to the informal sector many margins of adjustment are 
available. Wages were rising in the organized sector, in the eighties, but there was a 
contraction even in the absolute numbers employed. If a rise in wages is correlated with 
productivity, it would not impact on inflation. Although real wages are procyclical, the net 
rise would be positive over the cycle. It would reflect not only cyclical factors, but the rise in 
productivity as development takes place. 
 
Macroeconomic policy can be stimulatory, especially if foreign capital is available on 
demand, as long as price of food remains low.  
 
Implications for Macroeconomic Shocks  
The features catalogued above imply that an adverse supply shock would lead to a correlated 
demand shock. The supply shock need not be restricted to technology but could be in the 
price of wage goods, terms of trade or industry structure.  
 
After a supply shock, industrial demand falls as consumers protect their food basket inspite of 
a rise in its price. There is high political sensitivity to inflation. Therefore public investment, 
which accounts for a large part of total investment, is routinely cut in inflationary periods. 
Public investment, especially in infrastructure, has been shown to crowd in private 
investment. The latter also slows down. In addition, money supply is tightened in such 
periods and strong credit restraints are enforced. The real interest rate can rise. In periods of 
greater uncertainty, investment decisions are postponed because of the irreversibility of 
investment. As a result lower investment accompanies higher inflation.  
 
If nominal interest rates are rigid, real interest rates fall with inflation, giving a stimulus to 
investment. But even if nominal interest rates are rigid, credit rationing becomes more 
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stringent. Implicit interest rates then rise. The present discounted value of future expected 
marginal products that determine the investment decisions of a forward looking firm, fall as 
inflation rises. It has been widely documented that across the world, high interest rates, 
inflation and low investment tend to occur together (Bruno 1993).  
 
Countries, Institutions and Events  
Variety in institutions, as outlined above, has been reflected in the divergent experiences of 
DCs with foreign inflows.  
 
In India, starting in the seventies, there was a jump in remittances from nationals abroad. 
Initially foreign exchange reserves accumulated and the savings ratio rose. Domestic 
borrowing financed rising public investments. This was one of the factors stimulating the 
economy (Goyal 1993) and the eighties saw higher growth and lower inflation. Revenue 
deficits combined with the low productivity of public investment, however, led to an 
unsustainable accumulation of domestic debt. The tapering off of remittances and their 
substitution by NRI deposits and other debt at high interest rates, the oil price rise of 1989, 
and the Kuwait war were all shocks that the economy could not withstand.  
 
In 1991 reforms included a steep devaluation, rupee convertibility on the current account, and 
gradual import liberalization. Inflows of foreign capital accelerated, but these were neither 
steady, nor large enough, and were accompanied by fluctuations in interest and exchange 
rates. Annual rates of output growth reached above 7 per cent over 1994-96 after an initial 
dip. But 1997 saw an industrial slowdown, caused partly by real rates of interest that reached 
22 per cent.  
 
Reform in many Latin American countries succeeded in reversing earlier capital flight. 
Outflows on private account normally accounted for a large part of this. Citizens could easily 
shift from holding domestic currency to dollar balances, a phenomenon known as 
dollarization. Monetary policy did not accommodate the rise in demand for real balances as 
inflation fell from triple digits. Interest rates rose to absurd levels that pulled in foreign 
capital, even while they led to a fall in investment, and carried the seeds of a future reversal 
of capital flows. If investment did not rise and consumption and inflation did, inflows 
reversed once more. Agenor and Monteil (1996) report that it remains a puzzle why real 
interest rates rose sharply in Southern Cone stabilization of the eighties. This had not 
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occurred under the stabilization of the eighties. Our analysis will suggest that the use of the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor, in the later period, may have been partly responsible, 
since large changes would have occurred in expected real exchange rates.  
 
There are countries, mostly in South-East Asia that managed to absorb large inflows of 
foreign capital as long as output and export growth was high. Imports could then safely rise. 
A rising absorptive capacity can keep expected profits high enough to exceed world interest 
rates and induce a steady inflow of foreign capital in accordance with the requirements of 
domestic investors.  
 
The safest alternative is to follow growth enhancing policies. If this is done foreign inflows 
can become an opportunity, allowing capital and budgetary constraints to be relaxed. The 
country experience suggests that high and fluctuating real interest or inflation rates serve as a 
warning signal of incorrect policies and choices. It is possible for India to grow as South-East 
Asia did, avoid financial bubbles if it ensures that real interest rates remain low, and financial 
deepening provides hedging instruments. Therefore it is very important to understand 
potential causes for the steep rise in real interest rates. Standard reasons are a sudden rise in 
money demand, or very high government borrowing. But inflation has never been very high 
in India; therefore even if stabilization lowers inflation it will not have major effects on 
money demand on that count. If domestic and foreign capital assets are imperfect substitutes, 
the shift from monetary to debt financing of an unchanged budget deficit can drive up real 
interest rates very steeply (Dornbusch 1982), in a narrow market for Government debt. But 
under perfect mobility of foreign capital government borrowing alone cannot raise the real 
interest rate. Our model focuses on the effect of real exchange rate expectations on the real 
interest rate.  
 
Model Related Assumptions  
What are the assumptions most suited to the structure of the Indian economy? The arguments 
of the earlier section suggest the following simplifications in modeling: 
1. Perfect arbitrage, or that foreign and domestic financial assets are perfect substitutes. 
But domestic currency is not held abroad.  
2. The small country assumption of a given world interest rate, and prices of imports and 
exports. But foreign demand is not infinitely elastic at a given rupee price of exports.  
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3. Quantity variables in the M-F model are normalized to reflect a medium-run where 
capital and prices can vary. The normalization does not imply fixed coefficients. But 
in steady state output and capital grow at the same rate. The output capital ratio, u, is 
then constant. The components of aggregate demand have a simple and transparent 
specification. Investment is a function of the real interest rate and normalized output. 
Both investment and savings can be derived from constrained intertemporal 
optimization decisions. Savings is less responsive to the real interest rate as wealth 
and substitution effects work in opposite directions. The interest rate drops out with a 
logarithmic utility function. Output is demand determined and there is excess 
capacity.  
4. The aggregate supply function reflects the dualistic labour market and the dynamics 
of inflation in NT goods. It is derived from the maximization decision of a 
representative firm.  
5. The policy and dynamic response of the system leads to demand shocks that are 
positively correlated with, and magnify, supply shocks.  
6. The nominal exchange rate is fixed, or there is a managed float3.  
7. The LM curve drops out, because of 6, and the real interest rate is determined by the 
arbitrage equation. This is compatible with the medium-run focus, and captures the 
effect of the real interest rate on investment and savings. But there is some degree of 
policy freedom: stabilization and sterilization policies can vary the ratios of money 
stock to output. Under a managed float a hybrid of nominal exchange targeting and 
nominal money targeting is possible for extended periods. 
 
3. Aggregate Demand and Supply in the Medium-run  
The M-F model addresses questions such as: “What are the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policies on output in an open economy with capital mobility, under a fixed or floating 
exchange rate?” We want to substitute growth for output, discover if monetary variables can 
have long-term effects on real variables, and derive implications for surges in foreign capital 
flows.  
 
                                                          
3
 In India since the late eighties, the exchange rate was pegged to a basket of currencies with undisclosed 
weights. The regime is therefore somewhere between a fixed exchange rate and a managed float. A devaluation 
occurs under a fixed nominal exchange rate regime and is a policy decision. Depreciation is market driven under 
a flexible exchange rate. 
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We start with the equations of the model. The first four are definitional. Next the key 
equations used in the analytics
4
 are derived: aggregate demand (AD), aggregate supply (AS), 
external balance (FF).  
 
The nominal exchange rate, E (Rs. per $) has  as its rate of devaluation or depreciation. The 
foreign price level is P
*
, domestic P, and the rate of inflation π. The real exchange rate, z = 
EP*/P. The equilibrium value of z is  ̃. We work with two rates of inflation,     
    .  
Investment is I, savings S, and output normalized by capital is u. Superscripts e denotes an 
expected value. * refers to the rest of the world, '(a dash) denotes the percentage rate of 
change. Equation (1) shows the rate of change of z. 
  
 
                                                                                     
As we are considering the medium-run we take the Fisherian relation to hold with      : 
                                                                                                
The nominal rate of interest i adjusts to the rate of inflation. Therefore the real rate, r, is not 
affected by inflation. Assets are perfect substitutes, therefore the return from domestic assets 
must equal the return in domestic currency from foreign assets. That is, the arbitrage equation 
3 must be satisfied. If the LHS exceeds the RHS then there would be an inflow of foreign 
capital and vice versa. 
       
                                                                                    
The expected rate of change of the real exchange rate,   
 , is a function of the difference 
between the equilibrium and the actual exchange rate. Under rational expectations, the speed 
of adjustment can be taken to be large enough to be neglected as in equation 4, which sets out 
the relationship between u, r, the shock ηm, and  ̃. This is derived in section 4, where equating 
the current to the capital account of the balance of payments determines ̃. The real exchange 
rate rises (depreciates) as u falls and π rises. But under a fixed nominal exchange rate if, 
    
 , z itself will fall (appreciate) (equation 1), therefore the gap between the two,   
  will 
be larger. Because the nominal exchange rate is fixed under our managed float, the terms in 
the inflation rates get added to equation 4. If equilibrium and actual z, move in opposite 
directions   
 , will be larger. 
  
   ̃                                                                       
               
                                                       
                                                          
4
 These three curves are the standard tools for a first analysis of open economy macroeconomics. Jha (1995) is a 
recent example of their application in the context of a DC. 
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The M-F model refers to a short-run. Over the long-run, if output was less than capacity, 
prices should fall and as real balances rose, so would output. If prices can rise even if output 
is below capacity, and there are multiple equilibria in u, π,, this mechanism would not work. 
Some degree of endogeneity of money can prevent the real balance effect from leading to full 
capacity. Alternatively, counter cyclical speculative demand for money can absorb excess 
money balances. High(low) investment associated with the equilibria would lead to high(low) 
growth. We examine the implications of such multiple equilibria below.  
 
The downward sloping AD in Figure 1 has been derived from medium-run IS-LM curves in 
Goyal (1995b), where it is argued that the Indian economy has switched between high and 
low u associated with low and high π in the medium-run without hitting the boundary of full 
capacity. It has been trapped by equilibria such as E1 and E2. Growth and inflation have been 
inversely related. Normalized demand falls with the real rate of interest and inflation, and 
rises with the real exchange rate (equation 5). A depreciation stimulates net exports. The 
effect of   
  comes in through r. With multiple equilibria and positive fixed costs, not only is 
the AS curve (equation 6) downward sloping, but adverse supply shocks, s are magnified, 
and the AS curve shifts upwards. Correlated demand shocks,      , shift the AD to the left. 
There is an inverse relation between u and π. 
                                                                    
                                                                         
The AS is derived from the firm's point of view. Lucas obtained a very simple supply curve 
by considering the labour leisure decision of the worker. We consider a firm with some fixed 
costs; unit costs are lower at higher levels of production, as overheads get stretched. The 
goods and labour market structure of section 2 underlies the open economy supply curve. As 
the AS curve is almost flat, inflation will be determined by shocks that shift it up. Is a 
devaluation one such shock? To answer this, we need to look at the interaction between 
wages and prices in our typical DC.  
 
There is a real wage target determined by the nutritionally efficient wage. Over the medium 
run, a rise in price that lowers real wages below this target will lead to arise in nominal wage 
inflation. NT goods prices are set as a mark-up on nominal wages (equation 7). We continue 
to assume that inflationary expectations are realised. Inflation in nominal wages is then a 
weighted average of inflation in T and NT goods (equation 8). Inflation in T goods is the sum 
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of any devaluation in E and the world rate of inflation (equation 9). The domestic rate of 
inflation is a weighted average of inflation in T and NT goods (equation 10). Finally, 
inflation in NT goods is directly proportional to that in nominal wages.  
 
 
Therefore if the weights  and Θ are high, devaluation will not have a large impact on 
domestic inflation. Reforms that lower the weights as NT goods become traded, can reverse 
this result. In India policy shocked the price of NT goods when agricultural support prices 
were raised to coincide with the devaluation. Food has a very large weight in the 
consumption basket, therefore high rates of inflation followed the devaluation. After any such 
shock equilibrium is re-established after expectations are realized, and lags in the system are 
worked through giving us a shift in the medium-term aggregate supply (equation 7). Lag 
subscripts have been omitted from equations 7 to 11, for simplicity. 
                                                                                       
                                                                                 
      
                                                                                 
                                                                               
                                                                                        
We now come to the key analytics of this paper: the volatility of r due to   
 . Although it is a 
simultaneous system, π and u can be viewed as determined by aggregate supply and demand, 
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r by the arbitrage equation and  ̃ by the current and capital account (section 4). But   
  
depends on all these variables and can orchestrate a jump from one equilibrium to another.  
 
Figure 2 graphs the external balance FF, or the combination of r and u such that the demand 
for foreign and domestic assets are balanced. Also in the Figure is the downward sloping IS 
curve. Equations 12 and 13 depict the disequilibrium adjustment in the foreign exchange and 
goods markets respectively. The speed of adjustment of the former exceeds that of the latter. 
Equation 12 gives specific functional forms by substituting equation 4 in the arbitrage 
equation 3. FF and IS depict equilibrium values for these equations. That is, they give the 
points where r' and u' respectively are zero.  
 
There is a unique equilibrium at r2 = r
*
 when   
   , and π = π* = π2. If u is lower than this 
value, there would be an expected depreciation of z in line with the change in ̃. Any attempt 
to reduce the money supply, as it leads to r > r
*
 would induce foreign inflows. Such a policy 
would be compatible with the perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets only if it 
led to an expected depreciation of z, or upward shift of FF. At the same time, the AS would 
shift up and AD to the left (Figure 1); u will fall, π rise.  
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To satisfy the arbitrage equation r must be rising above FF and falling below it. This explains 
the direction of the vertical arrows in Figure 2. Foreign inflows should appreciate the 
exchange rate, to equate the demand and supply of foreign exchange, but here they lead to an 
expected depreciation of z; the arbitrage equation must be satisfied because of the faster 
mobility of capital. When        
  a further rise in r occurs since   
  becomes unstable in 
such a situation. Since E is fixed and the volatility of prices cannot match that of financial 
expectations, the only jump variable whose speed matches that of foreign inflows is r. It must 
rise to prevent an outflow. But a rise in r will raise  ̃   
  and r again. Moreover, in a narrow 
money market, attempts to restrict the money supply require ever rising r as the latter attracts 
more inflows that in turn need to be sterilized. Stabilization policies accompanying 
liberalization often imply a tight money policy that harms fundamentals. A rise in the 
domestic over the world rate of real interest is compensated by an expected depreciation of 
the exchange rate. 
            
                                                                        
                                                                            
     
                                                                               
Above (below) the IS curve there will be excess supply (demand) and u will shrink (expand), 
explaining the direction of the horizontal arrows in Figure 2. When demand exceeds supply, u 
will rise (equation 13). 
                                                                                     
The curves may be non-linear, but they can be linearized around the equilibrium point. This 
gives a valid picture of the local dynamic flow, as long as the trace of the Jacobian of the 
dynamic system is not zero. The signs of the latter indicate the nature of the equilibrium. The 
Jacobian J is shown below: 
  |
    
    
|                                                                                 
Subscripts indicate partial derivatives. 
            
                 
                
           
     follows from the stability of the aggregate demand curve and      because of the 
negative effect of the real interest rate on aggregate demand. The large induced response of 
investment to changes in u (section 4) gives     . The compatibility of this with stability 
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of aggregate demand follows from the adjustments derived in Goyal (1995b). a3 captures the 
effect of r on  ̃ coming through the effect of r on                 . 
            
                                                                      
The equilibrium is a saddle point. The sign of the trace(tr) is indeterminate and that of the 
determinant (det) is < 0. The absolute value of the negative first component of the 
determinant exceeds the positive second component. The reason is the interest inelasticity of 
the IS curve, and the quantitative insignificance of u in the arbitrage equation. In Figure 2, SS 
is the stable arm, and UU is unstable. This is clear from the direction of adjustment in each 
quadrant. Adjustments in the mark-up make the goods market equilibrium stable inspite of a 
periodic high propensity to invest (Goyal 1995b). But the excess of induced investment over 
savings in response to a change in u (section 4), combined with the volatility of capital flows, 
and of expectations that can cause a jump in r or E, lead to saddle instability and multiple 
equilibria in an open economy.  
 
Reforms constitute a favourable supply shock and can raise foreign inflows, but sterilization 
in a narrow money market can lead to a monetary squeeze. Then, according to our model, 
there would be a sharp rise of the interest rate along EH with u falling along HG. The 
expected depreciation of z must rise, that is, FF must shift up to     . As r rose the IS curve 
would shift to the left, compounding the fall in u. After a number of such shocks, r and E 
would be too high to be sustained, leading to a further devaluation
5
. Credit will now be 
available at a higher cost. Its demand for productive purposes would therefore be reduced. 
The rise in r constitutes an adverse supply shock that counters positive ones, associated with 
structural change.  
 
Proposition 1: If E is fixed, a tight money policy leads to a sharp rise in r and   
 . Inflation 
can be rising at the same time.  
 
The M-F model tells us that a fiscal stimulus is possible
6
 under a fixed exchange rate, but we 
see below that it is viable over the long run only if it leads to a rise in investment and exports 
without a reduction in savings. Policies that help stimulate these are the only sustainable 
                                                          
5
 Such a scenario is supported by the discovery of a positive or zero correlation between exchange rates and 
interest differentials (Svensson, 1992). 
6
 Under flexible exchange rates in the M-F model fiscal policy is ineffective. The exchange rate appreciation 
resulting from a fiscal stimulus will neutralize the latter as exports fall. 
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ones. Can foreign borrowing be too much? Can it reduce savings? In order to answer this we 
need to look at the sustainability of debt. 
 
4. The Equilibrium Exchange Rate and the Sustainability of Debt 
Two basic accounting identities that follow from national income accounts are: 
   
  
  
                                                                           
                                                                                
where f is gross foreign inflows and the current account deficit, nf is inflows net of interest 
payments; b stock of foreign debt; I investment; S gross domestic savings
7
; nm net imports or 
m-x, x exports, r the real rate of interest.  
 
But what are the behavioural determinants of I,S, nf and nm? Consider a planner’s 
intertemporally optimum decision on the amount of savings, investment and foreign debt in 
an open economy (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Chapter 2). Under perfect markets and 
information, foreign borrowing would be used to smooth consumption. The world interest 
rate is taken to be fixed and equal to the rate of discount on consumption
8
. The decision of 
the representative consumer would then coincide with that of the planner.  
 
For a DC there would be an initial period of accumulation of foreign debt. The latter would 
finance current account deficits in the balance of payments. The accumulated sum of these 
deficits should be equal to the discounted value of future surpluses. There are limits to 
borrowing. Debt cannot increase asymptotically faster than the interest rate. In the limit, the 
current account surplus will be just sufficient to finance interest payments on steady state 
debt.  
 
Figure 3 graphs and equation 17 showing a positive net foreign inflow, nf, at the world 
interest rate, r
*
. S is taken to be independent of r, because the intertemporal wealth and 
substitution effects work in opposite directions
9
. A rise in r decreases I. 
                                                          
7
 Gross national savings equal gross national product (GNP) minus consumption, while gross domestic savings 
are gross domestic product (GDP) minus consumption. GNP = GDP - rb. 
8
 A ‘patient’ country with a consumption rate of discount lower than the world interest rate would come to own 
most of the world's capital. This is an unrealistic result and can be ruled out by allowing for boundary 
conditions, changing rates of discount, and many consumers. 
9
 Interest on debt in foreign currency equals r
*
 even in the medium-run when r is changing. Movements in 
expected exchange rate and domestic interest rate will be in opposite directions, so that we can neglect the effect 
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Investment is determined not by domestic savings, but by ‘q’ or the discounted present value 
of future expected marginal product. Temporal mismatches between the two are made good 
by nf. Gross national savings are high when output is high compared to future expected 
output, and are independent of the level of debt and of r if the utility function is logarithmic 
in consumption. Consumption is smoothed over time. Any change in the level of debt leads to 
an adjustment in the level of output and consumption. Savings net of interest payments on 
debt are unchanged. A temporary adverse shock to productivity does cause savings to fall to 
maintain consumption, but could be offset by a future positive shock.  
  
 
 
In such conditions the fear that a rise in foreign borrowing would lower domestic savings is 
misplaced. The former would be determined by investment requirements. Too much of 
foreign inflows could not come in, where the discipline of future repayments are recognized 
by the omniscient borrowers.  
 
Intertemporal optimization is only a useful benchmark. In DCs it is difficult to know and to 
reach the ideal level of consumption smoothing. Myopia might lead to a desire for over or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of fluctuating r on interest payments on foreign debt. Fluctuations in interest payments make national savings 
differ from domestic. But the opportunity cost of domestic and foreign debt is the same. Moreover I-S 
determines nf except in a financial panic. Under full sterilization the money stock will not vary even with the 
rise in reserves under fixed exchange rates. In any case the medium-run focus allows an abstraction from long-
run changes in stock. This, together with the absence of full capital account convertibility in India, and the 
importance of foreign inflows at the margin, justifies the emphasis on the flow effects of foreign capital, and on 
the arbitrage equation, rather than portfolio and real balance effects on consumption. 
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under consumption, but capital markets do not make it possible to implement the desire. High 
risk and the lack of perfect capital markets could imply that current consumption is too low. 
But it is also possible that the consumption of the Government and of the rich may be too 
high. Permanent adverse shocks, if they lower expected future consumption and growth, will 
lower current investment and borrowing. Temporary shocks would lower domestic savings. 
Ideally, as development occurs, consumption should increase more slowly than its potential, 
so that both savings and investment rise. The decisions of risk averse foreign creditors under 
uncertainty, and their interaction with domestic policy over a medium-run, have to be taken 
into account. There can arise a consensus, in the face of adverse shocks, that the level of debt 
is too high, given reduced potential growth prospects. Still we assume that the excess of I 
over S determines net inflows, except during a panic.  
 
The current account balance must be equated to the capital, to satisfy equation 16. The 
current account deficit is a function of the real exchange rate. Sustainable net capital inflows 
(nf = I-S), that constitute the capital account surplus, depend on expected future productivity. 
The equating of the two determines  ̃ as a function of real factors.  
 
The net demand for foreign goods (supply of foreign currency) is given by I-S and the net 
supply of foreign goods (demand for foreign currency) by nm. Net inflows equal I-S and 
supply the foreign currency. The demand for it, nm, is a declining function of z: The equality 
of demand and supply gives  ̃ (Mankiw 1994). Assuming simple linear specifications, 
             
                 
I-S is a positive function of u, because of our assumption of a strong induced response of 
investment to u. A negative relationship can also occur if an exogenous fall in I causes a fall 
in u through the Keynesian multiplier. By equating the two equations we can solve for  ̃. The 
a coefficients are simple algebraic transforms of the p and q coefficients. 
 ̃                
 
To the left of the dashed zero line in the Figure nm < 0, so that x > m and S > I. Underlying 
the nm curve are individual tastes for foreign goods, while I-S comes from the intertemporal 
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optimization of firms and households. Equations 16 and 17 must be satisfied ex-post
10
, but 
the ex-ante neo-classical equilibrium presupposes equilibrating movements in prices, 
exchange or interest rates. Further, the current account deficits and I-S gap must be at a level 
that can be sustained over the long-run. That is, they can be financed by expected future 
surpluses. As E, r
*
 ,π* are fixed, the only way the current and capital accounts can be equated, 
in the medium-run IS through a change in domestic prices, output and interest rates. Does this 
work? 
 
The nm curve is not flat. Net imports respond inelastically to a change in . A rise induces an 
expansion in the labour intensive exports essential for development. But a nominal 
devaluation can raise  only if two conditions are met. First, after the devaluation, internal 
inflation must be less than the world rate of inflation. For this, the prices of NT goods must 
be relatively constant, and there must not be indiscriminate monetary expansion. Second, 
after the equilibrium  ̃ and nm are attained, S and I must be rising at similar rates, so that net 
                                                          
10
 Two gap models, once popular in the development literature, worked with an ex-ante inequality between nm 
and I-S. A trade (savings) constraint meant that the former exceeded (fell short of) the latter. In the short run the 
trade constraint often held and the ex-post equality was attained by rationing and import restrictions at an 
overvalued exchange rate. There were many other possible macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms and one of 
the major contributions of the recent two gap literature is to highlight these. Taylor (1994) provides an 
illuminating survey. In the net inflation raises savings through forced taxation and redistribution in favour of 
profit incomes. Bacha (1991) argued that the government budget constraint could begin to bite even before the 
foreign exchange constraint and necessitate the inflationary creation of revenue. The many different constraints 
and their possible shifts meant that the net effects of any shock on the economy became uncertain. The analysis 
could, however, generate insights and point to possible complications. Even so, the emphasis on forced saving 
led to counter-intuitive results such as that inflationary government policies in the face of foreign inflows could 
raise savings and lower growth in a demand determined equilibrium. 
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foreign inflows are constant. Ideally a rise in exports should raise income and domestic 
savings, shifting the vertical S curve in Figure 3 rightward
11
, even as I is rising. From Figure 
4, if the growth in I is less (more) than in S,  ̃ will be depreciating (appreciating), or the I-S 
curve shifting leftward (rightward). Indeed, if liberalization is accompanied by an upward 
shift in the nm curve,  ̃ can be constant only if I-S and therefore nf is also rising. 
 
Now assume a supply shock such as a rise in administered food prices. If      , the real 
exchange rate would be appreciating or falling from equation 1. However, as the I-S curve 
shifts left-ward, due to the correlated demand response (including monetary tightening),  ̃ 
rises to  ̃  above its original level  ̃ . That is, the devaluation required exceeds the amount 
that would compensate for the inflation. The automatic adjustment mechanisms in the 
economy magnify the disequilibria rather than remove it. If liberalization leads to an upward 
shift of the nm curve
12
, the problem would be accentuated, with a further rise in  ̃.  
 
Proposition 2: If E is fixed, nm is not perfectly elastic, and             then  ̃ will be 
depreciating while z appreciates. 
 
A devaluation itself may not cause inflation, but if the devaluation is accompanied by an 
inflation it would become useless.  
 
How will foreign investors be affected? Under rational expectations, if     
    
  would be 
positive as the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate  ̃, rose. The domestic interest rate 
must rise to compensate. The I-S gap determines nf if the arbitrage equation is satisfied, but if 
the required rise in interest rates becomes too large, a panic withdrawal of foreign capital can 
arise. A cumulative outflow that leads to the devaluation it fears can be triggered off. Such a 
case is of more than just academic curiosity. Similar crises are endemic in DCs, examples in 
the nineties include Mexico and Thailand.  
 
                                                          
11
 Savings can rise in the Keynesian fashion with exports if income and productivity rise, or if propensities to 
save out of export income are higher. From the intertemporal optimization and consumption smoothing point of 
view, of section 4, savings would rise if a boom in exports leads to current income being higher than expected 
future income. 
12
 Multiple equilibria in u may imply that nm shifts up with u. Restrictions on imports of consumer goods can 
restrain this. Our analysis would apply as long as the shift in I-S is greater. 
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The variables will behave virtuously if foreign inflows finance rising investment, savings and 
exports at low rates of inflation and a constant real exchange rate. In developed countries, the 
recipe for inflation control has normally been tight money, low government budget deficit, 
and wage restraint. Our model shows that this recipe need not be valid for DCs. In the latter, 
growth stimulating policies are the most successful. 
 
5. Multiple Equilibria and Expectations  
Multiple equilibria with an inverse relationship between growth and inflation are reinforced 
by movements in exchange rates. From Figure 4 we know that the lower growth equilibrium 
would have a higher  ̃ associated with it. As u falls  ̃ will rise13. If, in the low growth 
equilibrium,      , z would be appreciating, while z would be depreciating. It follows that 
  
  would also be rising (expected depreciation). Multiple equilibria in π, u and z reinforce 
each other.  
 
Proposition 3: A rise in π,  ̃, r and fall in u tend to occur together.  
 
Multiple equilibria associated with development increase uncertainties regarding the 
equilibrium level of z, and the potential for crises
14
. 
 
Liberalization reform is normally undertaken in an inflationary environment, and is 
accompanied by stabilization policies, including a reduction or constancy in key monetary 
ratios, and a cut in budget deficits. Rising r reinforces the adverse shock on investment. On 
the initial opening out, expected profits normally exceed both domestic and foreign interest 
rates, leading to a large inflow of capital. But if macro policies do not stimulate growth, the 
surge would only feed a bubble that would eventually collapse, necessitating a major 
devaluation. Rising interest rates may no longer compensate for an expected depreciation. An 
outflow of foreign capital occurs, leading to a massive devaluation.  
 
                                                          
13
 Jaime Sera pointed out that in Brazil, as interest rates rose it became profitable to utilize trade credit from 
abroad by raising imports of intermediate goods. Commenting on Anne Krueger’s paper at the Seminar in 
honour of Gustav Ranis, Yale University, May 1996. 
14
 It becomes difficult to distinguish whether there is a genuine deterioration in fundamentals or it is a “fad”. 
There is a growing academic literature on fads. Banerjee (1991) had a seminal paper in which it is individually 
rational to follow others. Nevertheless, a loss of information and welfare occurs. Fads tend to overfeed 
themselves and ultimately burst, while changes in fundamentals are sustainable. In the presence of multiple 
equilibria, it is possible to mistake enthusiasm for a genuine switch to a “good” equilibrium. 
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It is ironic that traditional stabilization policies, that emphasize fiscal and monetary 
discipline, have their roots in a concern about inflation, and a belief that if this kept low 
evaluation will not be necessary. But monetary tightness needs to be carefully defined, if a 
unique market clearing equilibrium does not exist. As we saw, monetary tightening can cause 
an overshooting of nominal exchange rates or real interest rates leading to inflation from the 
supply side. Even without inflation, r can rise. Then  ̃ would rise although z was unchanged.  
 
Remark: Capital inflows can be unsustainable without policies that support growth, and are 
designed to suit the institutional structure and context. 
 
 Our analysis can explain the combined presence, in many developing countries of high rates 
of inflation, high and fluctuating real rates of interest, combined with a collapse of output and 
investment and surges in capital flow. South-East Asia has shown a quantum leap in feasible 
rates of growth to be possible. Foreign capital that comes in anticipation of high growth can 
panic at setbacks. But in a labour surplus DC foreign inflows do represent a resource to be 
utilized. The pitfalls are many, but, there exists the possibility of designing positive 
adjustment mechanisms that shift the economy to the “good” set of equilibria.  
 
Some of these are: 
1. The nominal exchange rate must be constant or, if      , depreciating slightly. 
India’s current policy rule, that is, to intervene when E is appreciating but not when it 
is depreciating seems designed to achieve this. The unspecified weights tying the 
home currency to a basket of currencies can be used to outguess speculators. But there 
is a need to be careful about possible overshooting.  
2. Policy must concentrate on improving fundamentals by raising investment, both 
public and private, lowering inflation and raising exports.  
3. Money supply must target output or interest rates rather than inflation. The latter 
should be tackled by supply side measures. World real interest rates are low, and are 
not expected to rise in the near future. This should be made use of to ensure low 
domestic interest rates. If r can be kept at around r
*
 while profit rates are higher, the 
share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in foreign inflows would rise. FDI is more 
stable and contributes directly to investment.  
4. The allocation of investment has a major role to play in controlling inflation. An 
adequate supply of wage and NT goods at prices commensurate with the average 
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purchasing power must be ensured. The market may need some help in making such 
an allocation of investment. For example, it has been noted that in Indian agriculture, 
private investment follows public.  
5. Equity financing of investment should be encouraged. Use of foreign inflows and 
deepening of financial markets make this possible. Risk would be reduced with lower 
fixed interest payments. Forcing marketability of equity in public enterprises will 
improve the productivity of public investment. 
6. Where there is no immediate balance of payments crises short-run capital gains taxes 
can prevent speculative and “follow the leader” type of behaviour on the part of 
foreign investors. Allocative flexibility would not be lost if exemptions are allowed 
for reinvestment within the country. Such taxes can temper unsustainable enthusiasm, 
while a consistent policy package can ensure that the inflows promote growth.  
7. Structural changes that raise efficiency, deepen financial markets and raise incentives 
for savings are required 
 
6. Conclusion 
Heterodox stabilization programs are a via-media between Keynesian and the PPP perfect 
markets monetarist paradigm. But they still need to be adapted to suit the structural features 
of the particular economy they are applied to and to have more of a growth orientation. It is 
argued that macro policies can create an unnecessarily adverse environment that makes it 
more difficult for structural reforms to succeed. It is not that there is a unique way to succeed, 
but policies that are inconsistent with structure can raise the costs of change.  
 
In the intertemporal optimization model a known stream of future output is obtained by full 
utilization of resources. The role of foreign capital is primarily to smooth consumption over 
time. Capital markets are perfect and there are no liquidity constraints. In the medium run this 
determines the gap between I and S, and the deficit or surplus on the current account of the 
balance of payments required to finance it.  
 
In a developing economy, there are two flies in the ointment. First, uncertainty regarding 
potential development and rates of growth. Second, the effect of this and the policy rule 
followed on  ̃ and   
 . Policies that do not recognize the existence of multiple equilibria can 
unwittingly push the economy to the worse set. Excessive movements of foreign capital 
unrelated to long term requirements can then occur.  
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If foreign capital is a kind of money, then can these movements not be neutralized by 
allowing its price E, to change? Unfortunately under a flexible nominal exchange rate, the 
requirements of the capital and current accounts often conflict. For instance, under a capital 
inflow, E would fall or the rupee would appreciate. This is not consistent with the rise in 
exports required for development and long term servicing of the foreign capital. There is also 
the possibility of excess volatility in E, arising from rapid movement in foreign money.  
 
The predicament does not end there. If the Central Bank buys foreign exchange in order to 
keep the exchange rate fixed, the money supply would rise and with it possibly, inflation 
leading to a real appreciation of the exchange rate. If the money supply is neutralized by sale 
of government bonds, the interest rate could overshoot enhancing the foreign inflow, and 
harming output and investment. Even if z is kept constant  ̃,   
 , r could be rising and could 
instigate a snowballing of pessimistic expectations.  
 
A clear perspective emerges for policy in the face of rapid foreign inflows following reforms. 
In labour surplus DCs, where a quantum leap in productivity is possible, macro policies that 
stimulate this are the only viable ones. 
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